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Abstract 
Elections remain the basic fundamental to any democracy; they are also the political activities most open to 
manipulation leading to violence in Africa. Whilst in some advanced countries, elections are seen as an 
instrument for peace, elections in Sub-Sahara Africa are often fraught with conflict and political violence.  The 
role of electoral administrators is very critical in ensuring the achievement of better democracy through elections. 
Studies indicate that electoral administration is given little consideration in the investigation of political 
democratisation, especially in transitional democracies. This paper seeks to test whether electoral administration 
contributes or reduces conflict in Africa through a comparative study between Ghana and Kenya. The study 
adopted descriptive correlational survey to find out the extent of association between electoral governance and 
conflicts in Africa. The study stipulated two research objectives and hypotheses. These hypotheses were tested to 
ascertain their impact on the rate of electoral violence. The results from the study indicated that all two stated 
hypotheses were supported by the data. The findings show a critical association between the role of election 
management bodies, electoral system and the rate of violence. The study also discovered high effectiveness of 
electoral governance in Ghana compared to Kenya.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The global democratic call for citizens’ participation and representation in the affairs of the state, gave some 
African countries the experience of organising acceptable elections as a means of adopting democratic system. 
While democratic system of governance goes beyond only elections, it must be noted that real competitive 
electoral process is pivotal in almost all definitions of democracy (Schumpeter, 1942; Dahl, 1989; Alvarez et al., 
2000). However, elections are political events most open to manipulation (Reynolds, 2005). Adam Przeworski 
succinctly states that “competitive elections are the quintessential manifestation of organized uncertainty in a 
democracy” (Przeworski, 1991, p.14). In some advanced countries, elections are seen as an instrument for peace, 
but elections in Sub-Sahara Africa are often fraught with conflict and political violence. The electoral process in 
Africa’s new democracy has with couple of exemptions portrayed by savagery (Omotola, 2008).  
Nambiema (2012) avers that, the democratic history of Africa has indicated that competitive elections are 
double-edged swords which either comes with change of power or social disorganisation leading to conflict and 
civil unrest. Bekoe (2010) asserts that about 25% of general elections in Africa degenerates into electoral 
violence. According to Pastor (1999), local and international election observers have asserted that 41% of 
elections in Africa are mostly flawed, while 28% represent elections with disputed outcome. This puts the 
democratisation process of many Africa countries on the line, thereby threatening the prospect of democratic 
stability and consolidation on the continent. For example, approximately 600 people were reported dead and 
700,000 others displaced during the 2007 elections in Kenya, which led to violence, following dispute over the 
election results (BBC News, 2008). Many elections in some African states like Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe, 
Ethiopia, Chad, and Zimbabwe have produced violence. However, in some countries like Ghana, South Africa, 
Zambia and Senegal, successful elections have been used to expand the frontier of democracy.  
From conflict management perspective, not only should the voting public be allowed to vote regardless of 
ethnicity, gender, race, class and religion, they should be certain that their vote will count towards deciding the 
winner. This clearly underscores the crucial role election administrators play throughout the electoral cycle and 
the impossibility of building a vote-based system with an impromptu methodology. This study adopts a 
comparative case approach to assess the status of election administration as a conflict resolution mechanism 
using Ghana and Kenya. The study seeks to identify which of the two countries, competitive elections is 
quintessential indication of political instability since coincidentally both countries had their 2012 general 
elections results disputed and contested at their respective Supreme Court with a common ruling, dismissing the 
claims of the petitioners that, the elections were fraught with fraud and irregularities. The overall objective of 
this exploratory study is the role of election administration on election-related conflict in Africa. The study 
adopts a descriptive correlational survey method to establish the relationship between electoral administration 
and conflict in Africa. The study also focuses on assessing the capacities of the EMBs in Ghana and Kenya in 
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conducting free and fair elections with the objective of identifying how their operations contribute to either 
eliminating or heightening electoral disputes. 
 
2.0 Research Problem 
There is abundance of literature on election administration in both developed and developing economies around 
the globe. Studies show that democracy takes place in the shadows of threat of violence in Africa (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006). Studies by Bekoe (2010) indicate that electoral violence affects about 25% of all general 
elections in Africa. This has been corroborated by Pastor (1999) that the highest number of election 
disagreements recorded in Africa is based on disputed electoral outcome. Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler (2002) 
avers that disagreements and disputes over election results in developed democracies normally fall within the 
accepted standard “margin of error,” but in some African countries election results are flawed due to 
manipulations and fraud. The role of election administration on violence, dispute and conflict in Africa has been 
discussed largely by many authors (Chazan, 1982; Nugent, 2001; Friday, 2007; Berman, Eyoh, & Kymlicka, 
2004; Ekeh, 2004). Nonetheless acknowledging the role of election administration in resolving violence, 
disputes and conflict in Africa still remains unresolved. The reasons why ballots create occasions for bullets in 
some African countries before, during and after elections, when scholars have so strongly suggested that 
democracy promotes peace still remain unanswered in literature. 
According to Mozaffar (2002), these disputes over electoral outcomes increase tension and eventually 
degenerate into full scale conflicts. Notwithstanding this danger, Dunning (2011) posits that elections remain an 
indispensable ingredient in democratic consolidation. Mansfield & Snyder (2007) theorise that institutional 
framework must exist for a country to avoid or reduce the threat of violence during transition to democracy. This 
means that lack or weak institutional architecture needed to manage fragile democracies renders the entire 
democratic process vulnerable. As this debate wages on, little is investigated about the impact of election 
administration, particularly the performance of election management bodies on conflict resolution in emerging 
democracies. A study by Lund (2003) indicates that 68 election-related deaths have occurred in Ghana since the 
reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. In Kenya, by contrast, elections have degenerated into violence, 
and ethnic conflict. Studies show that between 1991 and 1997, election-related clashes led to about 1,800 deaths, 
3,000 injured and 600,000 individuals displaced in Kenya (KHRC, 2011). Not only was the 2007 fraudulent 
election a setback to democracy, post-election violence killed about 1,500 people and displaced 700,000 others 
(USIP, 2010). The value of damage to property in election-related clashes in Kenya was estimated to be KES 
210 million (USD 2,625,000) (Africa Watch, 1993, 42). Again, violence surrounding Kenya’s 2007 elections 
resulted to 117,216 individual assets damaged, while 491 state properties were damaged as well (CIPEV, 2008, p. 
346). 
The question is why has Kenya’s elections collapsed into fraud and widespread violence, and why has 
Ghana’s elections remained peaceful and facilitated its democratic consolidation? Elections in Ghana have 
remained relatively free of malfeasance and violence. This comparative study is particularly important because 
both Ghana and Kenya have had high levels of support for democracy, previous peaceful democratic transfers of 
power, significant ethnic diversity, and similar levels of economic development. The general goal of this study is 
to understand the role of electoral administration in democratic governance and whether it contributes in any 
significant way to reducing or heightening conflict in Africa through a comparative study. The study adopted a 
descriptive correlational survey to measure the relationship between electoral administration and conflict in 
Africa. 
 
3.0 Significance of Research 
The misleading but high tendency to equate elections to democratic credential of a country underscores the main 
essence of this study. The decision to select Kenya and Ghana makes the study expedient. Ghana’s GDP 
currently stands at USD65.5 billion with a population of about 30.28 million and annual growth rate of 6.7% 
(GSS Report, 2019). Comparative to Ghana, Kenya’s GDP stands at USD78.5 billion with a population of 48.5 
million and annual economic growth rate of 4.9% (KNBS, 2019). Although Kenya has a higher GDP than Ghana, 
economic indicators show that Ghana has a high GDP per capita of $2,214 than that of Kenya’s $1,681. Again, 
the annual economic growth of Ghana’s 6.7% is higher than that of Kenya’s 4.9%. The two countries have been 
rated differently in terms of electoral politics despite their historical convergence according to Afro Barometer 
Report (2006). Ghana is the first country in the Sub-Sahara Africa to gain independence in 1957. Kenya attained 
independence status in 1963. Ghana is rated high above Kenya in comparative African ranking (Afro Barometer, 
2006). For example, whilst Kenya’s 2007 presidential election produced widespread fraud and violence, which 
was, described as a clear setback to democracy, that of Ghana’s 2008 presidential elections remained peaceful 
and facilitated its democratic consolidation. However, coincidental it was in 2012, both countries had to settle 
the dispute over the outcomes of their 2012 presidential elections result at their respective Supreme Court. The 
study is therefore significant for accounting for the differences in the processes of electoral management, 
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administration and conflict resolution in Ghana and Kenya. This study would provide comparative insights in 
electoral administration and conflict resolution mechanism for countries in Africa and beyond. 
 
4.0 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
Many Africa countries have had their presidential elections degenerating into violence and conflict. The stability 
and security systems of African countries hinges on disequilibrium during periods of elections as results of threat 
of electoral related violence across the sub region. As a result of the increasing election brutality in Africa, this 
study is anchored on the following questions:  
1. What is the relationship between the performance, independence, credibility of election management 
body and the rate of electoral violence in Africa? 
2. Is there is a relationship between electoral system and electoral violence in Africa? 
 
5. 0 Theoretical Orientation for the study  
Elections take place on the basis of certain accepted theoretical, legal and empirical framework. The concept of 
democracy remains a puzzle despite countless attempts by academics and practitioners to find a common ground. 
This paradox continues to be one of the key contending issues among many scholars, researchers and authors in 
the field of political science, political economy and other related field. It must be noted that, different definitions 
and theories emphasise different aspects of democracy. Lindberg (2006) recognizes that there is no necessary 
link among a particular term, like democracy, the conceptual construct in the mind, and the empirical 
phenomenon to which it refers. 
Various studies have shown a strong relationship between elections and democracy. In disputing election-
democracy theory, some scholars argue that although democratic processes could be reduced to the holding of 
internationally observed multi-party elections, there still remain no agreement on the definition and principles of 
democracy (Ake 1996; Colomer, 2000 et al.). Whilst these studies see democracy as bigger than elections, others 
restrict the definition of democracy to elections. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) posit that while elections can 
take place without democracy, democracy cannot take place without elections. Some scholars have, in the 
Schumpeterian way reduced democracy to elections (Dahl, 1998; Huntington, 1991; Schumpeter, 1942; Karl, 
1990; Alvarez et al., 2000). According to these scholars, democracy is best defined in terms of competitive 
electoral politics and the institutional structures that come with it. Agbaje and Adejumobi in their effort to 
investigate the central role of elections to democracy averred that ‘election is a suitable system for culminating 
delegate government’ (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, p.26). In supporting the centrality of elections to 
democratic governance, Lewis (2007) contends that elections serve as an affirmation of democratic rights, 
inclusion, and transparency. According to Jinadu (1997), election is an inclusive and participatory tool for 
citizens integration in the democratic affairs of a state. While elections do not, all by themselves, constitute an 
all-round democracy, Bratton (1998) avers that they, nonetheless, remain essential for rule by majority system 
and also a fundamental imperative, for more extensive democratic consolidation. This means that elections have 
become an indispensable and unavoidable requirement and necessity of democracy.  
Competitive elections play a central role in democracy (Dahl 1998; Karl 1990; Alvarez et all., 1996). Cohen 
(1983) contends that the primary value of elections is to educate, entertain and give the citizens a feeling of 
participation in the affairs of governance. Citizens influence on government policies, according to Van Ham 
(2009), is defined as how government is responsive to the policy preferences of voters. Thus, asking to what 
degree governments formed after elections implement policies that are congruent with the policy preferences of 
voters. The outcome is that, elections allow the people to participate in choosing representatives and by 
extension, in the formation of governments in a competitive manner. This means that elections afford people the 
opportunity to choose who they want to lead them (Thomassen, 1994). Moreover, elections have also been seen 
as an essential instrument for economic development. Feng (1997) argues that political competition enhances 
democratic governance thereby promoting economic growth. In an attempt to show the relationship between 
elections and development, Kambudzi posits that ‘properly conducted elections in any African nation would be a 
noteworthy commitment to Africa social and material development’ (Kambudzi, 2008, p.1). According to 
Kambudzi, elections enhances the lives of natives by offering them perspectives and alternatives by political 
contestants on fundamental issues of national life and settling on weighted decisions among them.  
Scholars of democratisation have begun to ask whether elections might have spill-over effects on other 
components of the political regime, thereby triggering broader democratic processes (Lindberg, 2006; 2009). 
The quality of the electoral process is then likely to be a crucial factor, as engaging in electoral manipulation and 
fraud might be an effective strategy for governments that seek to avoid being held accountable for their past 
actions, and an incumbent that came to power through fraudulent elections might have little incentive to be 
responsive to citizens’ needs (Van Ham, 2009). 
Various evaluation criteria and datasets have been employed by many scholars in assessing the quality of 
democratic elections (Pastor, 1999; Van de Walle, 2003; Elklit and Reynolds, 2005a; Lindberg, 2006a; Birch, 
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2008, 2011; Hartlyn et al., 2008).  However, investigating the nexus between elections and democracy go 
beyond academia, as the international community sees investment in democratic governance in developing 
countries crucial for global peace.  For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) dedicated 
about 35% of its annual budget in 2009 to democratic governance, representing USD1.4 billion, a substantial 
part of which was dedicated to electoral assistance. 
The question as to whether high quality elections have consequences for democracy as expressed in the 
absence of popular protests, civil war or coup d’états continues to generate interest among academics and policy 
makers. A number of different conceptualizations have emerged on quality of elections (Elklit and Svensson, 
1997; Pastor, 1999; Schedler, 2002a; Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002; Elklit and Reynolds, 2005a; Lindberg, 2006a; 
Birch, 2008, 2011; Lopez-Pintor, 2010). The quality of an election can be conceptualized as the degree to which 
political actors at all levels and from different political strands see the electoral process as legitimate and binding. 
However, scholars have expressed divergent opinions about election quality either positively, by specifying the 
presence of criteria that render elections democratic, or negatively, by identifying the principle-violations that 
cause elections to be undemocratic. Positive definitions use conceptual labels ranging from free and fair 
elections, clean elections and democratic elections (Elklit and Svensson, 1997; Lindberg 2006a; Munck 2009; 
O’Donnell, 2001). Negative definitions on the other hand, refer to flawed elections, electoral malpractice, 
electoral manipulation, electoral fraud and election rigging (Pastor 1999; Birch, 2008; Schedler 2002a; Lopez-
Pintor, 2010). 
Elklit and Reynolds (2005a) for example, identify the following 11 sequential steps in the electoral process 
that define election quality-legal framework, electoral management, constituency and polling demarcation, voter 
education, voter registration, access to and design of ballot paper, party and candidate nomination & registration, 
campaign regulation, polling, counting and tabulating the vote, resolving election related complaints, and post-
election procedures. Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) distinguish the 3 phases of quality election administration: 
rule-making defines the ex-ante choice of rules of electoral competition and rules of electoral governance, rule 
application which deals with organizing the electoral contest, and rule-adjudication that deals with effective 
handling of ex post publication of election results and resolving disputes.  
 
5. 1 Election Management Bodies (EMBs) and Electoral Violence. 
Electoral governance must exist within the framework of institutional architecture. Zafiu (2012) posit that the 
choice to analyse development of institutions is a significant condition for the success or failure of post-war 
elections. According to Zafiu, the efficiency of policy implementation by these institutions can shape 
expectations, build confidence or ignite fear among state actors. The most eminent institutional architecture with 
the end goal of this study is the election management bodies (EMBs). Domestic and international actors consider 
EMBs an important framework for democracy because of its strategic role in shaping the quality of elections and 
democratisation. This makes the review of the theoretical framework that exists between EMBs performance and 
electoral violence imperative in this study. According to Kerr (2013), EMBs matter for elites in emerging 
democracies because their performance directly influences the likelihood of electoral manipulation and the 
incidence of electoral administrative irregularities. In distinguishing the two dimensions of EMB performance: 
autonomy and capacity, Kerr argues that variations in EMB autonomy and capacity shape the strategic 
interaction of elites as well as their evaluations of electoral integrity. EMB must ensure that the electoral process 
is transparent enough to give free, fair and credible electoral outcome.  
A study by Sue (2001) on electoral process from the perspective of an electoral management body, divides 
the process into four main steps: establishment of the EMB and legal framework; EMB planning; EMB 
implementation; and EMB post-election review and revisions. Reynolds (1999) attests that the readiness and 
arranging stages of election administration are regularly neglected in light of the tight timelines within which 
EMB's conduct elections. A well-planned and well-organized election that is professionally and precisely 
regulated can expand cooperation by competitors and voters, and construct confidence in the electoral process 
and the election results (Harris, 1998). This implies that good arrangement can maintain a strategic distance from 
a considerable lot of the issues that Reynolds (1999) portrays as obstacles to electoral administration. 
Election administration can be affected by many factors. These factors according to Sue (2001) include: 
experience level of EMB; quality of the legal framework; level of trust and degree of consensus on the electoral 
system and EMB; availability of time and resources; political and cultural history; and degree of participation 
and quality of partnerships. In addition to this, Nyamu (2003) enumerate some general factors that affect the 
quality of EMB to include: the organizational level of the EMB, the quality of its systems, planning, personnel, 
procedures, training, budget and oversight; degree and quality of EMB consultations with political 
parties/candidates; the EMBs level of accessibility and its openness to correct problems found during 
implementation; degree of dissemination of voter education information to public; degree of enforcement of 
election law and code of conduct; and the degree of trust built up with the public, political actors and 
government.  
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EMBs as part of ensuring the legitimacy of the electoral process are required to enforce the rules of the 
game and assure fairness with the cooperation of political parties and citizens. This according to Lopez-Pintor 
(2000) requires EMBs to be inclusive, sustainable, just and independent. Various studies have attributed the 
causes of election-related disputes, violence and conflicts in Africa to the weaknesses in electoral systems, 
electoral administration and dispute resolution mechanism (Gurr, 1993; Pastor, 1999; Reynolds, 2005). 
According to these studies, in order to reduce the rate of electoral violence in transitional democracies there must 
be the need to have an effective electoral system. Huntington (1991) corroborates this assertion by stating that 
the gap between high levels of political participation and poorly integrated institutions is one of the key problems 
of political development in transitional democracies. Election Management Bodies (EMBs) are responsible of 
the administration of the election. According to Kerr (2013), the design of EMBs relates to the rules of electoral 
administration, and that EMBs are the institutions responsible for making sure that these rules are being 
implemented effectively and impartially during the election period. Powell (2004) regards EMBs as “instruments 
of democracy”. This is particularly important in emerging democracies where there is less confidence in the 
legitimacy of other political and state institutions not to manage elections in favour of the incumbent. EMBs help 
ensure “procedural legitimacy” and “substantive uncertainty” of elections by effectively managing various 
aspects of the electoral process and holding political elites accountable to the rules of the electoral game 
(Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). 
Studies and policy orientation indicate that election management bodies can be distinguished as 
independent, governmental, and mixed models (Hounkpe et all., 2011; López-Pintor, 2000; Wall et al., 2006). 
According to López-Pintor (2000), three categories of EMBs exist in Africa’s new democracies. López-Pintor 
points out that 53%, 8% and 39% of EMBs in Africa constitute the independent, government, and mixed models 
respectively. It must be noted that the degree of independence of an election management body affects the level 
of confidence in electoral process. According to Elklit & Reynolds (2001), public perception about the 
independence of EMB is almost as actual as the outcome of elections. Lehoucq and Molina (2002) goes further 
to aver that independence of EMBs is a cardinal institutional development that strengthens the democratisation 
process in some countries. Studies also show that EMBs associated with the government may reduce the 
perceived institutional independence, and hence, confidence in the election outcomes (Elkit and Reynolds 2002; 
Hartlyn et al. 2008). In supporting this position, Wall et al. (2006) assert that elections conducted by EMBs that 
are accountable to government and financed with ministerial budgetary allocation lack credibility in the face of 
voters. This suggests that EMBs with excessive governmental influence may lead to a perceived lack of 
professionalism and impartiality that lead citizens to question the fairness of the election process (Shane, 2009). 
Höglund, Jarstad and Söderberg Kovacs (2009) corroborate this contention by concluding that government-based 
electoral management bodies are more prone to political manipulation with tendencies of creating electoral 
violence.  
While the functions and responsibilities of EMBs vary across countries, some of the core functions and 
responsibility include registering voters and candidates, training electoral staff; conducting elections, tabulation 
and counting of votes, and, announcing election results. A more fundamental issue relates to the question of 
professional and impartial application of dispute resolution laws by the EMBs. According to Asamoah (2019), to 
prevent electoral violence in Africa, the core assignment of the election management bodies is to conduct 
elections with integrity, credibility and free and fair in order to guarantee the acceptability of the election results 
to prevent the electoral body from accusation of fraud. However, it is unclear whether EMBs would be 
considered independent given that they are also a stakeholder to administer the elections.  According to Omotola 
(2009), while laws are important to shape and reshape electoral contests and provide the basis for litigation in the 
event of violations, no law can, on its own, guarantee fair play in the conduct of elections. Election management 
bodies must therefore commit to the principles of independence and impartiality in order to achieve the buy-in 
by candidates and the general public. This would enable these EMBs to conduct elections that comply with laws 
to avoid interference of state actors in the discharge of their functions. In order to professionalise itself, the 
electoral commissions should undertake intensive capacity building trainings to minimise the number of disputes 
that would arise as a result of electoral administration (Asamoah, 2019). Figure 1 shows EMB models. 
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Figure 1: The Three Models of Electoral Management 
It can be posited that electoral contestants can see electoral process and results as acceptable when the 
elections meet some established standards such as participation, competition and legitimacy. These democratic 
indicators can be guaranteed on condition that the EMB provides the framework that strengthens effective 
electoral administration. Omotola (2008) identified this framework to include the autonomy of the EMBs 
measured in terms of their structure, motivation, transparency and general capacity. These conditions can be 
achieved if the EMB is insulated from governmental abuse. This mean that the configuration of EMBs could 
determine the quality or otherwise of an electoral outcome with its resultant effect on peace and conflict. For 
example, in Côte d’Ivoire, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) always has their election results 
validated by the constitutional court before a president is deemed to have been validly elected. This election 
management model created political crisis in Ivory Coast after the 2010 elections when the President of the 
Constitutional Court, a known supporter of Laurent Gbagbo, Paul Yao N’Dré, invalidated the election results of 
CEI and declared Laurent Gbagbo as the winner (Bassett 2011).  Table 1 shows the distribution of EMB models 
in Africa. 
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Table 1. Distributions of EMB Models in Africa 
Government   Mixed               Independent  
Togo    Burkina Faso     Angola 
Cote d’Ivoire   Burundi      Benin 
Guinea    Cameroon     Botswana 
Djibouti    Cape Verde     Congo DR 
Mauritania   Central Africa Republic    Gambia 
Rwanda    Chad      Ghana 
Seychelles   Comoros     Guinea Conakry 
    Republic of Congo    Guinea-Bissau 
    Equatorial Guinea    Kenya 
    Gabon      Lesotho 
    Madagascar     Liberia 
    Mali      Malawi 
    Senegal      Mauritius 
    Togo      Mozambique 
          Namibia 
          Nigeria 
          Niger 
          Sierra Leone 
          South Africa 
          Tanzania 
          Uganda 
          Zambia 
          Zimbabwe  
N=7 (16%)      N=14 (31%)     N=24 (53%) 
Source: Electoral Management design: International IDEA handbook (2006) 
 
5.2 Causes of Electoral Conflicts in Africa 
Electoral violence is not restricted to election day alone. It can happen before, during and after the elections. 
Most African countries have experienced political crisis and democratic setbacks due manipulations in the 
electoral process. According to Hyde and Marinov (2012), electoral violence has increased by 50 percent in 
Africa between 1990 to 2006 compared to the period between 1945 and 1989. Fischer (2002) posits that these 
violence results from an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, 
physical assault, blackmail, destruction of property, hijacking of electoral materials at gun point, and political 
assassination. The most glaring appearance of constituent brutality is at some point the notorious open 
affirmation by contesting candidate that election is 'a do or die business' (Omotola 2007). These pronouncements 
go far to portray that the elections must be won at all cost. This breeds apprehension in the psyches of the 
electorate. Studies have related the reasons for election related clashes to variables such as negative impact of 
ethnicity, religious contrasts, political publicity and exploitation by the political elites. Bekoe (2010) asserts that 
the risk of electoral violence is likely to be high in Africa due to the formation of political parties along ethnic 
groupings.  Again, research indicates that ethnic cleavages are significantly associated with voting behaviour and 
structure of party systems in Africa (Horowitz, 1991, 1993; Mozaffar et al., 2003; Norris and Mattes, 2003; 
Posner, 2005). Political parties in Africa seek to win power through polarisation and exploitation of exiting fault 
lines among diverse ethnic groups for votes. This increases the rate of antagonism and prepares the ground for 
violence at the least provocation. 
Tensions over land rights, employment and ethnic marginalization are three common sources of recurring 
electoral violence. Bekoe (2010) concludes that these areas intersect and manipulated by politicians to their 
advantage. Wilkinson (2004) contends that in a vote-based systems ethnicity is considered as a forceful crusade 
used by political elite to cement ethnic dominance and decrease the significance of other politically important 
personalities. A case in point is the ethnic make-up of governmental issues and the state fueled hegemonisation 
by diverse parties in the Kikuyu ethnic clan during the 1963-1978 Kenyatta administration in Kenya. This 
"Kikuyuisation" involved combining political power leading to controlling interest in the Kenyan economy 
(AMANI Forum, 2008, p.11).  According to Hornsby and Throup (1992, p. 191), when Moi assumed control in 
1978, he embarked on a decade of gradual ‘de-Kikuyuisation' and ‘Kalenjinisation’ of Kenya. Fundamentally, 
Moi destroyed President Kenyatta's Kikuyu network of the political and economic elite and supplanted it with an 
effective coterie of his supporters, predominately ethnic Kalenjins (Foeken and Dietz, 2000, p. 124). The ethno-
political fusion creates situation where political parties are formed on ethnic lines to promote ethnic and 
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sectarian ideologies. This supports the assertion that ethnic voting and ethnic parties worsen divisions as opposed 
to alleviating them.  
Conflicts associated with elections have been placed at the door steps of some African leaders and losing 
political parties for several reasons.  A common cause of election violence is the cost of winning and losing 
political contest in Africa. Collier (2009) opines that, because the stakes of winning and losing are very high, 
elections may deepen communal frictions. According to Andreas Schedler (2006), elections are tools of 
manipulation employed by authoritarian governments to hold on to political power. Studies indicate that 
incumbents’ manipulation of the electoral system to hold on to power contribute to election-related violence in 
Africa (Whitaker, 2005; Bah, 2010; LeVan, 2011). This is manifested when incumbent government manipulate 
electoral laws to exclude sections of the community which threaten the security of the states. A specific example 
is where the incumbent government used the concept of Ivoirité-a policy introduced to identify indigenes from 
non-indigenes of Côte d’Ivoire as a discriminatory political tool to disqualify Alassane Ouattara as a presidential 
candidate in the 1998 and 2000 elections (LeVan, 2011). 
According to Wolf et al., 2004, Kenyans see political issues to be the second most noteworthy cause of 
conflict after boundary and land disputes. This means that periods of political crusades could create clash and 
asperity among political party supporters. On the other hand, Saideman & Lanoue (2005) assert that elections 
may serve to reduce extreme forms of dissent, as individuals and groups focus their efforts on getting their 
representatives elected by traversing societal cleavages to canvas for votes. They argue that elections may lead to 
restraint as groups try to avoid antagonising potential voters and build coalition partners. However, regardless of 
this assertion, many still believe that some activities of political parties directly or indirectly cause conflict 
before, during and after elections. These may include fraud, intimidation, gerrymandering, vote rigging and 
illegal interference with the electoral process. 
Again, studies have shown the effects of the closeness of elections results on stability and violence (Chacon, 
Robinson and Torvik, 2011; Przeworski, 1991; Colomer, 2000, Weingast, 1997). These researchers propose that 
the situation most favourable to the combination of vote-based system is equitably coordinated party rivalry. 
Evidence suggests that the credibility of the electoral management body can be a fertile source of election-
related violence. This means that imperfect elections can fuel potential post-election conflict (Brancati & Snyder, 
2011).  Although some countries have been able to immune themselves from election-related violence, evidence 
from many other countries suggests that election- related violence is widespread (Lindberg, 2009). A study by 
Fischer (2002) revealed that at least 50% of electoral processes observed in 2001 manifested significant election-
related violence before, during, and after the polls.  According to Fisher, while no single theory can account for 
all the root causes of election violence, there is general agreement that three elements are critical: the context of 
democratization or political change in which violence occurs, the effects of electoral system choice on conflict 
dynamics, and the nature and patterns of political mobilisation. It is therefore important to scrutinise public 
views on politics, elections, and security in determining threats to peaceful elections periodically. 
 
5.3 Election Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (EDRM) 
Literature on electoral studies suggests that democracy can have a dual purpose: promoting representation and 
institutionalising conflict resolution. Nonetheless, much of Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced conflict in recent 
decades. Majority of these conflict-related deaths, injuries and destruction of properties are election-related. As 
indicated by United States Institute for Peace (2010), 19-25% of elections in sub-Sahara Africa degenerates into 
violence. In most of these cases, violence recurs because of unresolved systemic issues with the youths at the 
center as both culprits and victims. Staffan Lindberg (2009) argues that elections can act as a vehicle of 
democratisation or regime reproduction. Studies by Paul Collier, Mansfield and Jack Snyder demonstrate that 
there is a high risk of elections in post-conflict situations re-igniting the conflict they are supposed to resolve 
(Collier, 2009; Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). According to Tohbi (2009), elections have acted as a trigger for 
violent conflict in many countries in Africa. However, much of these studies tend to focus on the causes rather 
than solutions to election-related violence. As a result, conflict prevention, management and reduction (CPMR) 
and peacebuilding among political stakeholders must be prioritised on continent to ensure that zero sum elections 
do not produce extreme outcomes. 
There are various forms of managing election disputes. As indicated by Ifeanyi (2006) there are two 
noteworthy techniques for resolving conflicts. These are Regular Dispute Resolution and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution. According to ifeanyi, disputes happening before, during, and after election can be managed utilizing 
five possible approaches. These are avoidance/denial; strategic withdrawal; confrontation; third party decision-
making and joint problem solving. The avoidance/denial procedure includes doing nothing about the issue with 
the trust that, with time, it would go away. The strategic withdrawal technique like the avoidance/denial the 
intervener does not take any prompt action on the issue or takes a mild decision but grabs the opportunity to buy 
quality time and space to arrange and take more decisive action.  An excellent illustration is the ECOWAS 
dispute resolution approach in Togo after the demise of President Eyadema in 2006.  As Albert (2006) briefly 
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puts it when the military attempted to forcefully seize power in Togo in 2006, ECOWAS requested that Togo 
reverses the situation within a stated time after which some other more punitive action would be taken against 
the country. This decision of ECOWAS was contrary to the call by the international community for the sub-
regional body to employ military power to accomplish the goal. The Third-party decision-making has to do with 
having to refer the conflict to a higher body with decision-making powers for settlement.  In most cases, this 
approach involves judicial settlement-a legal mode of end of dispute. An example is the judicial settlement of 
election petitions or referring a related matter to the ECOWAS Court of Arbitration for settlement. Case in point 
is when the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was invoked in Ghana and Kenya to adjudicate on the 
2012 and 2016 election petitions in the respective countries.  
The five dispute resolution methods can be further broken into two broad categories: the adversarial and 
non-adversarial dispute resolution. The adversarial methods are those that depend absolutely on legal framework 
and the use of legal compulsion. On the other hand, the non-adversarial method, negotiation and mediation are 
the two most important dispute management mechanisms in the alternative dispute resolution spectrum. This is 
because negotiation and mediation allow the disputants to determine the outcome of the peace process. It is 
worthy to note, however, that official bodies mandated to resolve election disputes depends largely on legal 
framework in the context of a particular country. This makes the situation differ from country to country. 
However, five methods are extremely unmistakable in surviving writing in the context of electoral administration. 
The first is for election management body to deal with the dispute over the election results. The second is for the 
dispute to be dealt with under the regular judicial process where cases could go as far as the country’s Supreme 
Court. The third is for the matter to be taken to a constitutional court or bodies of constitutional justice as 
reminiscent in some francophone electoral systems and the fourth is for the matter to be dealt with by a special 
electoral tribunal. Sweeney (2010) observed that regardless of whether election disputes are solved by a 
constitutional court, an independent tribunal, or an electoral complaints commission, the adjudicative procedure 
must adherence standards to ensure that specific post-election remedy systems comply with obligations under 
relevant international and domestic law. 
It is therefore important for political parties, contesting candidates, civil societies, election management 
bodies and the media to subject themselves to grievance procedure framework to help actualise these standards. 
More specifically in Ghana, individuals dissatisfied with the decisions of the Electoral Commission can go to 
courts, including cases involving voter registration and candidate nomination. Settlement of challenges to an 
application to register as a voter is under the responsibility of the District Registration Review Committee and its 
decision can be appealed to the Chief Registration Officer (High Court Judge of the respective Region). For the 
purposes of hearing cases relating to a challenged application at the time of registration, a District Registration 
Review Committee (DRRC) is established by law in each district, made up of representatives of the active 
political parties in a district and not more than four local persons known to be neutral and fair-minded. The 
Secretary to the District Registration Review Committee is the District Electoral Officer. The law provides that 
the District Education Director, and a representative of the traditional authority in the district be members of the 
committee. The electoral laws further provide that the Supervising High Court Judge of each region should be 
the Chief Registration Review Officer for the region and should determine appeals from voters aggrieved by the 
decision of the DRRC. The District Registration Revising Officer who is the Magistrate of the District Court 
settles objections or complaints related to the provisional voter register and the Magistrate’s decision can be 
appealed to the High Court. The validity of a parliamentary election can be challenged by a petition presented to 
the High Court within 21 days after the date of publication in the Gazette of the election results. However, if the 
election petition boarders on grounds of corrupt practice involving payment of money, it may be presented to the 
High Court before the official publication of results is gazetted (PNDC Law 284). 
 
6.0 Research Methodology 
This segment of the study describes the appropriateness of the chosen methodology. According to Polit and 
Hungler (2004), methodology refers to the way of obtaining, organizing and analyzing data. The study was 
predicated on the ideals of ontological and epistemological assumptions of quantitative research. A correlation 
descriptive survey approach was used to determine the role of electoral administration on conflict resolution in 
Africa. The study utilized existing theories and definitions to address the research questions since these questions 
focused on the level of relationship between the predetermined variables of election administration and conflict 
resolution (Creswell, 2001).  The survey was set out to obtain data on respondent’s opinion, experiences and 
attitudes about the role of electoral governance on conflict in Africa. Judgmental or purposive sampling method 
was employed to conduct the study. The population comprised persons in Ghana and Kenya. The target 
population consisted of election administrators (EMBs staff of the two nations), returning Officers (ROs), 
presiding officers (POs), civil societies, media, political parties, academia, and social movement groups. Data 
collection was done through administering structured questionnaires to respondents. A response rate of less than 
ten percent was expected. Due to interest in the study a response rate of 100% was achieved. A central web-
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based domain was created.  The e-mails sent inviting responses included a link, and ‘double clicking’ this link 
would take the respondent directly to the web-based survey. A total of 1,200 responses were received with 600 
each from the two countries.  The difficulty encountered was the seemingly low connectivity of the internet in 
terms of downloading responses for analysis. The rational of adopting the survey method in this study is the 
ability to gather data from a large sample of the population as asserted by (Creswell, 2001; Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005). 
The resultant statistical indicators from Ghana and Kenya was compared and contrasted to ascertain the 
general relationship between electoral administration and election-related violence. Demographic and personal 
profile information on respondents was gathered. This information on gender, marital status, and education on 
citizens in both countries used descriptive, paired wise test and correlational analysis to determine statistical and 
comparative figures on the sample population. Descriptive statistical analysis was used to deduce the extent of 
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. To ensure construct validity, a correlational 
coefficient between Ghana and Kenya was expected to average above 0.80. According to Chan and Chow (2005), 
construct validity with correlational coefficient of 0.898 and a re-test reliability coefficient of 0.803 is an average 
required to ensure instrument validation. 
 
7.0 Analysis and Presentation of Results  
An essential component of ensuring data integrity is the accurate and appropriate analysis of research findings. 
According to Shepard (2002), improper statistical analyses distort scientific findings, mislead casual readers and 
may negatively influence the public perception of research. This means that integrity issues are just as relevant to 
analysis of non-statistical data as well.  The purpose of this research study is to identify the role of electoral 
administration on conflict resolution in Africa. This segment of the study shows the demographic characteristics 
of respondents, and statistical data analysis. It presents descriptive statistics, frequency tables, figures in 
providing a better view of analysis in line with the stated research hypotheses.   
Table 2. Sample Distribution of Respondents on the Number of Electoral Administrators in Ghana and Kenya 
Electoral Administration               Ghana                 Kenya Total 
 Freq.   % Freq.    %  
Returning officers 5 .83 5 .83  10 
Presiding officers 100 16.67 100 16.67  200 
Civil Societies 100 16.67 100 16.67  200 
Mass Media 150 25.00 150 25.00  300 
Political Parties-Members 40 6.67 40 6.67  80 
Academia  100 16.67 100 16.67  200 
Election expect 55 9.16 55 9.16  110 
Social Movement Group 50 8.33 50 8.33  100 
TOTAL 600 100 600 100  1,200 
Table 2 shows the analysis of sample distribution of respondents on the number of electoral administrators 
or EMBs adopted for the study. The results show that there were eight dimensions of electoral administrators 
that the study looked at namely; returning officers, presiding officers, civil societies, mass media, political party 
officers, professionals in academia, election expect/observers and some social movement group in both Ghana 
and Kenya. The analysis show that out of 1,200 respondents selected for the study with 600 of respondents from 
Ghana and 600 respondents from Kenya, majority of them were from mass media in both countries representing 
25%, followed by those from academia, presiding officers and civil society group representing 16.67% of each 
country respectively, followed by election experts or observers representing 9.6% and the least represented were 
returning officers from both country representing 0.83% respectively. Due to limited number of returning 
officers in Ghana and Kenya, the number was significant for the analysis. 
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Figure 2: Sample Distribution of Gender Respondents of Election Administrators 
Figure 2 shows the analysis on sample distribution of gender of respondents of electoral administrators used 
for the study. The results show that out of 600 respondents from each country (Ghana and Kenya), in connection 
with Ghana, majority of them were males with 460 respondents representing 76.67% whiles the rest were 
females with 140 respondents representing 23.33%. Comparative to Kenya, majority of respondents were males 
with 480 representing 80%, while the rest of the respondents were females with 120 respondents representing 
20%.  Overall, Kenya male respondents were slightly higher than that of Ghana, but female respondents in 
Ghana observed a slightly higher number than that of Kenya.  
The study stipulated two main hypotheses to be tested. The first hypothesis stated that there is a relationship 
between election management body and the rate of electoral violence in Africa. In order to test this hypothesis, 
the spearman rank order was employed to test this issue from the views of electoral administrators. In testing this 
particular hypothesis four main issues were tested namely; performance, credibility, independence and rate of 
electoral violence. In determining performance, credibility, rate of electoral violence and independence of 
election management bodies (EMBs) in Ghana and Kenya in light of the relative quality of election is not a 
simple undertaking. One challenge argued by Mahama (2012), was the basis of determining how EMBs’ 
performance, credibility, independence influences election-related violence in emerging democracies, 
particularly in multi-ethnic societies in Africa. 
According to Mozaffar and Schedler (2002), in the democratisation process in Africa, election, has become 
a curse to some countries and a blessing for others. The researchers content that elections should be procedurally 
fair and technically sound and the results should reflect the will of the voters, freely expressed at the ballot box. 
In turn, the process should enhance public confidence in the electoral system as a whole because of its perceived 
fairness, accuracy, and efficiency which should invoke the acceptance of the results by all as credible. But as 
discussed in the previous chapters, elections conducted in some emerging democracies have either precipitated 
political disputes or have escalated simmering tensions to an outburst of conflict. In order to establish the 
relationship between EMB’s and the rate of electoral violence various questions were asked to ascertain this 
relationship by the use of spearman rank order correlation. Table 3 shows the assessment of the relationship 
between Election Management Body and the rate of electoral violence. 
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Table 3. Analysis on assessing the relationship between Election Management Body and the rate of 
electoral violence. 
EMB Items            Rank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance  
  
Elections from 1991-2012 Ghana Kenya 
Ranked the effectiveness of EMB institutions   High Medium 
Electoral commission provide adequate facilities  Yes Yes 
Police performance in ensuring peace Yes No 
Satisfaction with elections in connection with Voter Registration  Satisfied Satisfied 
How effective are media and others institutions towards 
election?  
Very 
effective 
effective 
There are effective and efficient performance of polling station 
staff in all elections I have witnessed 
effective effective 
Could you tell me if you are very satisfied at the overall 
situation in your country today because of elections?  
satisfied Not 
satisfied 
Are elections fair Fair  Not too 
fair 
How would you rank the quality of elections in your country Medium low 
Are you Satisfied with Democratic process in your country Medium Medium 
 
 
 
 
Independence 
Ranked the rate of autonomy of the electoral commission in 
your country 
High Medium 
Does the electoral commission have a high capacity to function Yes No 
 How satisfied are re you with elections in respect of 
impartiality of polling station staff 
Impartial Impartial 
Are you satisfied with the impartiality in tabulating results Not 
satisfied 
Not 
satisfied 
Duty as neutral body guided in its work only by the law  High Medium 
 
 
 
 
Credibility 
How free and fair is an election from 1991-2012?  Medium  Low 
Information on voting procedures and how to mark the ballots 
was excellent 
Medium  Low  
Skills of the staffs of voting centres Medium Medium 
High confidence in the Electoral Commission Medium Low 
Much trust on the police? Yes Yes 
Many people registered to vote in the most recent elections? Yes  No  
Do you trust the Electoral Commission Medium Low 
How much do you trust the Media during elections High High 
Electoral 
Violence  
Have you witnessed violence in elections before No  Yes 
High rate of electoral violence  Low Medium 
Observed electoral malpractices leading to violence in some 
regions of the country 
Low High 
EMB’s do not perform well leading to electoral violence No  Yes 
Have witness electoral violence throughout all elections in the 
country 
No  Yes  
Table 3 shows the analysis on the ranked views of respondents on the relationship between electoral 
management bodies and the rate of electoral violence. The comparative analysis show that on the issue of 
performance both countries EMB have performed well throughout the elections from 1991 to 2012. However, 
Ghana performed better on all the indicators than that of Kenya. The results show that on the issue of “Ranked 
the effectiveness of each of EMB institutions and leaders in carrying out the duties that are their responsibility”, 
majority of respondents in Ghana ranked its high as compared to majority of people in Kenya who ranked its 
medium. Moreover, on the issue of freeness and fairness of the national elections, majority of respondents in 
Ghana said fair while’s majority of respondents in Kenya said not fair. In addition, on the issue of performance 
of the independent Electoral Commission in connection with its duty as neutral body guided by the law, majority 
of respondents in Ghana said high whiles that of Kenya, majority of respondents said medium. This analysis 
clearly shows that the EMB in Ghana functions effectively as compared to Kenyan counterpart. However, on 
some indicators the performance of both EMBs in Ghana and Kenya was the same depicting the great 
performance of work by the two EMBs. On the issue of effective and efficient performance of polling station 
staff in all elections, majority of the respondents in both countries said effective showing great performance by 
polling station staff in both countries. 
Analysis was done on the independence of the EMBs in the performance of their duties. The results showed 
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that there is high independence of the electoral commission in the performance of their duties for Ghana and 
Kenya except on the issue of “Ranked the rate of autonomy of the electoral commission in your country” which  
the results indicated that majority of respondents in Ghana said high whiles majority of respondents in Kenya 
said No. Moreover, on the issue of “Does the electoral commission have a high capacity to function” majority of 
respondents in Ghana have a yes opinion whiles majority of the respondents in Kenya gave no opinion. Besides 
the two issues, the results indicated a greater independence of electoral commission in both countries. Further the 
credibility of EMBs was also tested to help establish a clear relationship between the effective functioning of 
these institutions in managing the affairs of elections. The results from the ranked order show that on the issue of 
credibility Ghana EMBs have a higher credibility than that of Kenya is comparison. On the issue of “In your 
opinion, how free and fair general elections (Presidential and Parliamentary elections) from 1991-2012” 
majority of respondents in Ghana said Medium whiles majority of respondents in Kenya said low”. This depict 
the low credible elections in Kenya as compared to that of Ghana. 
In addition, rate of electoral violence was also tested. The results indicate that there is high rate of electoral 
violence in Kenya than in Ghana. On the issue of “Did you see or hear of any violence related to the Presidential 
or Parliamentary elections in your country” majority of respondents from Ghana said No, while’s majority of 
respondents in Kenya said Yes. Further on that of “High rate of electoral violence”, majority of respondents in 
Ghana said low whiles respondents from Kenya said medium. Moreover, on that of “EMB’s do not perform well 
leading to electoral violence” majority of respondents said No in Ghana whiles majority of respondents in 
Kenya said Yes. In overall, it can be said that the higher performance, credibility, independence of EMBs has a 
greater relationship with the rate of electoral violence. The analysis shows significant relationship between the 
performance of EMBs and the rate of electoral violence. It indicates that there is a negative relationship between 
the performances of EMBs the rate of electoral violence. This means that the higher, the performance of EMBs, 
the lower the rate of electoral violence and the lower the performance in terms of independence and credibility 
the higher the rate of electoral violence. This is illustrated by the figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: Election Deaths Compared with EMB Performance 
Figure 3 illustrates the correlation between electoral performance of EMBs of Ghana and Kenya and the 
rate of electoral violence in two countries. It shows clearly that the performance of EMBs in the conduct of 
elections is inversely correlated to death toll registered as a result of electoral violence. It is evident from figure 3 
that since the 1992 general elections, the performance of the Electoral Commission of Ghana shows a steady 
progress in the quality of electoral service. This has contributed immensely to the reduction of election related 
violence in Ghana. Though, some violence occurred at the early stages of the democratic process, it got 
diminished or eliminated overtime. The performance of the Electoral Commission of Kenya though shows a 
weak foundation, it nonetheless made progress in 2002 and 2005. Surprisingly, this progress performance was 
eroded in 2007 general elections. This could be attributed to the executive interference in the management of the 
electoral body of Kenya in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections. Although the two countries share some 
commonalities in their political architecture, it is important to learn that Ghana’s history of credible elections and 
the low rate of election-related violence could be attributed to the issue-based and non-ethnic nature of political 
campaigns. On the contrary, elections in Kenya have to a large extent been influenced by ethnicity, 
discriminatory distribution of national resources, fear, and lack of fairness in the justice distribution system 
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(Nambiema 2012). This was epitomised in the 2007 general elections when the Kenya Electoral Commission 
suffered credibility deficit which contributed to its poor performance that eventually led to high incidence of 
electoral violence, deaths, displacement of people and loss of property. 
The second hypothesis of the study tries to examine the relationship between the electoral system of both 
countries and electoral violence. The study analysed individual issues in relation the electoral system and the rate 
of electoral violence in both Ghana and Kenya. A comparative and contrasting analysis was conducted on the 
performance systems of EMB in both countries from 1991-2012. According to Nicholas Kerr (2009), diffuse 
support for institutions is critical for the acceptance of election results. He asserts that this diffuse support arises 
when citizens respect the role and function of the institution even when the institution delivers outcomes that 
diverge from their preferences. Therefore, institutional trust is fundamental to assessing the performance of 
EMBs and their output in determining whether elections are credible. The analysis assessed the EMBs’ 
legitimacy. Thus, the legal status and the level of acceptance by the voters, and the extent of neutrality which is 
the absence of political control of the electoral process, and effectiveness of the EMBs service delivery per its 
mandate. Figure 4 shows the analysis on legitimacy of Electoral Commission of both Ghana and Kenya (1991-
2012).  
 
Figure 4: Comparative Analysis of Legitimacy of EMBs in Ghana and Kenya (2011-2012) 
Figure 4 deals with the analysis on the legitimacy of the EMBs of Ghana and Kenya. The result shows that 
both EMBs made a poor start in the conduct of elections at the resumption of multiparty elections in 1991-1992. 
The EC of Ghana improved progressively over the years. In 2008, EC Ghana managed the delicate task of 
refereeing one of the most keenly and closely contested elections in the history of Ghana. The incumbent, NPP 
government, lost and handed over power to the opposition, NDC Party. On the other hand, the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya fluctuated in its performance and services delivery to the Kenyan electorate. It made 
progress after the 1997 elections, gained high legitimacy in 2002 elections and the 2005 referendum on 
constitutional reforms. The Commission however, flopped in the 2007 elections as the elections appeared rigged. 
President Kibaki’s breach of constitutional arrangement in appointing the commissioners of the electoral body 
and the actions of the leaders EMB before, during and after election largely accounted for the low legitimacy 
rates of the Electoral Commission of Kenya in 2007. The legitimacy gap contributed to the perception that the 
elections may not be free and fair in Kenya. However, the 2011-2012 elections of both countries witnessed a 
massive improvement in their respective electoral system. 
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Figure 5: Comparative Analysis on Autonomy and Neutrality of Electoral Commission of Ghana and Kenya 
Figure 5 demonstrates that the higher, the level of legitimacy, the higher, the level of perceived autonomy 
and neutrality which influence the level of acceptance of election results as credible. The results show that the 
autonomy and neutrality of EC Ghana shown a continuous rise from 1991-1992 to 2000-2001 with little fall in 
2004-2005 and a higher rise in 2008-2009 and a steady fall in 2011-2012 elections. The steady fall in 2012 may 
be attributed to the election petition filed at the Supreme Court by the then opposition New Patriotic Party to 
challenge the validity of the 2012 election results.  However, the trend of autonomy and neutrality in connection 
with EC Kenya shown a tremendous improvement from 1991-1992 general elections and little platooned in 
2004-2005 and a drastic fall in 2008-2009 and a rise in 2011-2012. This shows much neutrality and autonomy of 
EC Ghana than EC Kenya throughout the elections conducted. Figure 6 shows the performance of both election 
management bodies. 
 
Figure 6: Analysis on Comparing the Performance of Electoral Commission of Ghana and Kenya (1991-2012). 
Figure 6 shows data analysis on the issue of performance of EMBs in both countries on the issue of 
appointment, tenure, finance, trust, performance, effectiveness and rate of electoral violence. A close link to the 
issue of legitimacy are the questions of autonomy and the non-partisan nature of the ECs as well as the issue of 
performance. The results indicate that there is higher score for Ghana in five areas (except finance and rate of 
electoral violence) than Kenya. Ghana’s EC demonstrated high capacity and during this period gained more of 
the confidence and trust of the electorate than the ECK had as indicated in the analysis. The analysis shows a 
high correlation between the quality of service provided by the election management bodies and level of 
autonomy, nonpartisanship, professionalism, rate of electoral violence of the two countries. 
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Table 4. Effectiveness of Electoral System and rate of violence in Ghana and Kenya 
Statement on Electoral System and Violence           Ghana         Kenya 
 Rank % Rank % 
Electoral System:     
How effective is the electoral system in your country High 80% Medium 65% 
How effective is the implementation of democratic process in your 
country 
Very 
High 
90% High 80% 
How effective and efficient is the EMBs in ensuring a good democratic 
process 
high 75% Low 30% 
Rate of Violence or Conflicts:     
The effectiveness of the system has helped in reduction of electoral 
violence and conflicts 
Agree 75% Agree 55% 
What is the rate of electoral violence in 1991-1992 elections High 75% Very 
High 
90% 
What is the rate of electoral disputes in 1996-1997 elections Medium 60% High 80% 
What is the rate of electoral conflicts in 2000-2001 elections Low 20% High 80% 
What is the rate of electoral violence 2004-2005 elections Low  30% High  75% 
What is the rate of electoral violence in 2007-2008 elections Very low 10% High 80% 
What is the rate of electoral conflicts in 2011-2012 elections Medium  45% Medium  50% 
Table 4 shows data analysis on the effectiveness of electoral system and the rate of electoral violence in 
Ghana and Kenya. The analysis is in two part. The first part deals with the electoral system in both countries 
whiles the second part deals with the rate of violence in connection with the electoral system. The results show 
high effectiveness of electoral system in Ghana compared to Kenya. The Kenya electoral system is moderate in 
terms of effectiveness from the views of respondents. The results also indicate that the implementation, 
acceptance and effectiveness of democratic process and principles in Ghana is very high as compared to that of 
Kenya which is high. The role of EMBs in ensuring effective and efficient democratic system through the ballot 
is high in Ghana compared to Kenya which is low. The results again show that in both countries the 
effectiveness of the system has contributed to the reduction of electoral violence. In comparing the respondent’s 
views on the rate of violence, the analysis indicates high rate of electoral violence in Kenya compared to Ghana 
which is low throughout all elections conducted in both countries. In critical analysis, it can be observed that 
ineffective implementation of an electoral system leads to high rate of electoral violence.  
 
8.0 Summary of Findings from the Test of Research Hypotheses 
Table 5 below indicates the test of research hypotheses which forms the basis of the findings of the study. 
Table 5. Test of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Statements  Explanation 
Null Hypothesis 
1 
There is no relationship between performance, independence, credibility of 
election management body and the rate of electoral violence in Africa 
Rejected 
Alternate 
Hypothesis 1 
There is a relationship between election management body and the rate of 
electoral violence in Africa. 
Accepted 
Null Hypothesis 
2 
There is no relationship between electoral system and election-related 
violence in Africa.  
Rejected 
Alternate 
Hypothesis 2 
There is a relationship between electoral systems and the rate of electoral 
violence in Africa 
Accepted 
The results from table 5 indicate that all the two studies’ hypotheses or alternated hypotheses found 
research support. This therefore explains that there is a relationship between performance, independence, 
credibility of election management bodies and the rate of electoral violence. Moreover, a relationship was also 
established between electoral system and the rate of electoral violence. All these findings establishing the 
relationships led to the rejection of all the null hypotheses in support of the studies’ stated hypotheses.  
 
9.0 Conclusion  
The concept of democracy remains a puzzle despite countless attempts of academics and practitioners to find a 
common ground. Different definitions and theories emphasize different aspects of democracy. The study 
stipulated two research objectives and two hypotheses. The first hypothesis was tested on four main issues 
namely; performance, credibility, independence and rate of electoral violence. The findings show a significant 
relationship between the EMBs and the rate of electoral violence. It indicates that there is a negative relationship 
between the performances of EMBs the rate of electoral violence. This shows that the higher the performance of 
EMBs the lower the rate of electoral violence and the lower the performance in terms of independence and 
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credibility the higher the rate of electoral violence. The second hypothesis stated that there is a relationship 
between electoral systems and the rate of electoral violence in Africa. The findings showed a significant 
correlation between electoral system and the rate of electoral violence. It was discovered that the ineffectiveness 
of EMBs in the implementation of an electoral system in line with the autonomy, legitimacy, and 
professionalism of the EMB leads to higher rate of electoral violence. This discovery indicates that the level of 
independence and non-partisanship execution of electoral administration is profoundly connected with the nature 
of electoral disputes and viciousness. This finding has established that there is a connection between the quality 
of election administration and the rate of electoral violence. In overall, the study’s hypothesis was supported by 
the data analysis.  It is recommended that to obtain democratic value through elections, African countries must 
develop an independent, autonomous, professional and effective election management bodies to neutralise the 
potential electoral and societal cleavages. This would enable election management bodies in Africa to conduct 
free, fair and credible elections that promotes peace and development on the continent. 
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